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I. INTRODUCTION 
The design and enforcement of competition rules is one of the cornerstones of European 
Union (EU) policy to support the European integration process and stimulate sustainable 
growth. In fact, the founding Treaty of Rome deemed that Member States would cede authority 
over competition issues to the European institutions, since this was considered to be essential for 
a well-functioning internal market. To support these objectives, the European Commission (EC) 
has been granted enhanced powers of enforcement in this field (Neven 2006). Nevertheless, the 
European environment for antitrust is characterized by a good bit of institutional complexity as 
in addition to the EC’s Directorate-General for Competition, the 28 Member States of the EU 
also have national competition authorities (NCAs). Van Waarden and Drahos (2002) make clear 
the thresholds that demarcate the boundaries between the NCAs and the EC; but in essence, the 
EC has jurisdiction over community-wide competition matters, while the NCAs have 
jurisdiction over national-level competition matters. Accordingly, the EC represents both the 
lead antitrust agency in the European context (Barros et al. 2013) and the European peer with 
respects to the US DOJ and FTC (White 2014). Our focus here is then on the effectiveness of 
EC antitrust enforcement as the Commission represents the preeminent – though not sole – 
European antitrust agency.  
Among the different sub-policies of antitrust enforcement (i.e., collusion, merger and 
abuse-of-dominance), this study focuses on EC merger policy.1 While policy debate and 
academic studies on the effectiveness of merger control are often based on whether the correct 
decision is made in particular merger cases (e.g., Duso et al. 2007, 2011; Kwoka 2013), merger 
policy entails more than just direct effects from the detection, amelioration and prohibition of 
                                                            
1Buccirossi et al. (2013) study whether the enforcement of antitrust policy across 13 jurisdictions during the period 1995-2005 
leads to enhanced efficiency and productivity. They find that institutional characteristics as well as enforcement efforts regarding 
merger control have a strong and significant effect on TFP growth. That said, they also show that institutions and enforcement 
activities related to ‘abuse of dominance’ and ‘cartels’ have even a greater impact. 
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anti-competitive merger activity. As many commentators agree (e.g., Nelson and Sun 2001; 
Davies and Majumdar 2002), direct effects might only represent the ‘tip of the iceberg’ when it 
comes to the overall impact of merger control, as substantial indirect effects also exist. In 
particular, indirect deterrence effects have been considered to be quite important, as firms are 
likely to internalize antitrust rules in their decision making and alter the types and frequencies of 
mergers they propose due to the presence – and changes in the tenor of – merger policy (Eckbo 
1992; Crandall and Winston 2003). An effective merger policy should then create incentives 
that shape the behavior of firms in terms of violating these rules, since it is unreasonable (and 
inefficient) to assume that merger policy can thoroughly vet and police all of the applications for 
the antitrust laws (Baker 2003). Thus, the effects of merger policy are not limited to the specific 
firms targeted by merger control, but also include all firms whose behavior and performance 
might be affected – i.e., deterred – in the future by specific decisions and policies (Sørgard 
2009; Salop 2013). In this vein, Joskow (2002, 99–100) notes that “the test of a good legal rule 
is not primarily whether it leads to the correct decision in a particular case, but rather whether it 
does a good job deterring anti-competitive behavior.”  
Since deterrence effects are so critical for effective merger policy, a small – but growing – 
literature exists that attempts to empirically capture merger-policy deterrence. Early empirical 
scholarship tended to employ broad comparisons in order to establish deterrence; e.g., Stigler 
(1966) compared changes in the composition of US merger activity in the years prior to and 
after the 1950 anti-merger amendment to the Clayton Act. Employing a similar approach, Eckbo 
and Wier (1985) considered changes in the composition of US activity with respect to the 
establishment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act. In a later study, Eckbo (1992) compared US 
and Canadian merger activity (during a period where the US enforced and Canada lacked 
effective merger policy) in order to consider whether US transactions tended to be less anti-
4 
 
competitive. Yet recent empirical scholarship has moved beyond such before/after and 
having/not-having comparisons in order to engage in specific analysis regarding the 
effectiveness of different merger-policy instruments. In particular, Seldeslachts et al. (2009) 
studied the general effectiveness of different merger-policy instruments across 28 antitrust 
jurisdictions and found prohibitions to uniquely yield deterrence in the cross-national context. In 
a follow-up study, Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2013) narrowed the scope of analysis to the 
industry level within arguably the most-important antitrust jurisdiction by considering the 
deterrence effects of US merger-policy instruments. Akin to the approach of Eckbo (1992) and 
Eckbo and Wier (1985), Duso et al.’s (2013) small-scale study considered whether EC merger-
policy yields deterrence in the form of altered merger proposals in subsequent years; i.e., 
whether the mergers offered up were more likely to harm non-merging rival firms. To date, 
however, there has not been an equivalent industry-level deterrence study to the comprehensive 
US study of Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2013) which focuses on the European Commission: 
the preeminent European antitrust agency. 
The principal aim of this study, therefore, is to investigate whether the employment of EC 
merger-policy instruments over the past two decades has yielded effective deterrence. 
Accordingly, we study the impact of EC merger-policy actions on firms’ proclivity to engage in 
future merger activity at the industry-level. We concentrate on the ability of different merger-
policy tools to generate forsaken merger activity; i.e., deals not proposed by potential merging 
parties. We also investigate whether EC merger policy yields greater deterrence in high-
concentration than in low-concentration industries, as effective deterrence would seemingly 
involve merger-policy actions generating greater deterrence in high-concentration industries 
since such mergers would more likely to hinder effective competition. In addition, we consider 
whether EC merger-policy actions principally deter transactions which are potentially anti-
5 
 
competitive as opposed to transactions which are clearly pro-competitive. Since the EC provides 
separate procedures for the notification of pro-competitive transactions, we can establish the 
population of transactions which are clearly pro-competitive and the population within which 
anti-competitive mergers may arise. Moreover, effective deterrence would seemingly involve 
merger-policy actions deterring potentially anti-competitive transactions in high-concentration 
industries. 
For the above purposes, we gathered information regarding all mergers notified to the EC 
from 1990 until 2009 – over 4,200 mergers – and regarding the type and frequency of merger-
policy actions taken by the EC: i.e., clearances, remedies, and prohibitions. We are also able to 
distinguish whether merger-policy actions took place in initial or secondary phases of the 
merger-review process. The ability to differentiate between different merger-policy actions at 
different stages is helpful as such differences can involve different costs for firms and, therefore, 
generate distinct deterrence effects (Seldeslachts et al. 2009; Salop 2013). We were also able to 
gather more precise information regarding the type of mergers (clearly pro-competitive and 
potentially anti-competitive) notified to the EC for the 2000-2009 period—a period where the 
EC created a ‘simplified’ track for pro-competitive merger notifications. The high level of detail 
involved with the EC merger reports suggests that our constructed database represents the best 
available data upon which to assess the industry-level deterrence effects generated by merger-
policy actions.  
The contributions of our study are threefold. First, we begin the process of factoring 
whether EC merger policy deters merger activity; thus, we begin the quantification of what has 
until now been un-quantified in the context of the European Commission. Second, we are able to 
examine which particular merger-policy instruments – and at what stage of the merger-review 
process – indicate substantial deterrence, and whether deterrence works better in those industries 
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where it might be most useful. As Crandall and Winston (2003, 4) argue, scholarship must 
“explain why some enforcement actions [...] are helpful and others are not.” Third, we can 
investigate whether EC merger-policy instruments deter future merger notifications of the type 
(i.e., a subset of the horizontal and vertical activities) that EC officials consider to be potentially 
anti-competitive, or whether these instruments deter future activities that EC officials consider 
to be clearly pro-competitive. The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows: 
Section II describes our deterrence framework. Sections III and IV respectively explain the data 
and estimation strategy. Section V discusses the empirical results, while Section VI concludes 
and provides some prescriptions regarding effective merger policy. 
 
II. A DETERRENCE FRAMEWORK 
We measure the deterrence effects of EC merger policy by employing the methodology 
from the economics of crime literature spawned by Becker (1968)—see Ehrlich (1972), 
Polinsky (1980), Shepherd (2004) and Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) for other studies in this 
tradition. In this framework, enforcement actions make criminals update their probabilities of 
being caught and their estimations of the punishments attached with being caught. The proposal 
of an anti-competitive merger is, of course, no crime in the strict sense, but the deterrence 
mechanism is analogous in this environment as undesirable actions are ‘punished’. Effective 
deterrence requires those tempted by anti-competitive actions to believe that there is a 
reasonable probability that transgressing those rules leads to being caught and suffering 
consequences (Craswell and Calfee 1986; Baker 2003). As noted in the theoretical framework of 
Seldeslachts et al. (2009), changes in merger-policy actions represent manifestations of actual 
changes in merger policy. In this framework, firms update their beliefs regarding an authority’s 
stance when they witness upticks and downticks in policy actions. For example, upticks in the 
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application of a particular merger-policy action lead to positive updating on the part of firms 
with respect to the probability of eliciting such an action in the future. Sah (1991) shows that the 
above properties are satisfied when perceptions are described by Bayesian inference. 
Accordingly, the methodological framework from the economics of crime literature provides a 
sound means for a specific analysis of the deterrence effects involved with different EU merger-
policy instruments (Garoupa 1997; Berk 2005). 
With the above in mind, we can generate our empirical setup where we consider the impact 
of changes in merger-policy actions on future levels of notified merger activity. Our framework 
is based on the idea that if deterrence exists, then a positive change in merger-policy actions 
should signal to future merging parties that the expected cost of proposing an anti-competitive 
merger has increased; in turn, a proportion of the planned anti-competitive transactions will be 
forsaken. Accordingly, there should be a negative relationship between merger-policy actions 
and levels of proposed merger activity in subsequent years. Further, if deterrence is not at play 
(e.g., if a particular merger-policy instrument is not perceived by merging parties to be costly), 
then we should see no relationship between merger-policy actions and levels of proposed merger 
activity in subsequent years.  
We must control for potential confounding factors; hence, the next section explains how we 
capture the merger wave, as this is an essential element in our empirical strategy to isolate 
deterrence effects. But our focus on changes in the frequency of future merger activity also 
raises the issue as to which merger types tend to be forsaken. Aaronson (1992) points out that 
deterrence manifests in two forms: frequency-based deterrence which focuses on forsaken 
mergers, and composition-based deterrence which focuses on future mergers being modified and 
shaped differently. Moreover, some scholars have expressed the concern that pro-competitive 
mergers are often deterred by antitrust (e.g., Eckbo 1989, 1992). It seems, however, more 
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probable that altering the tenor of merger policy would significantly impact anti-competitive 
activity. In line with this intuition, the Deloitte and Touche (2007) study for the UK Office of 
Fair Trading provides evidence via surveys that UK merger policy rarely deters pro-competitive 
mergers. More recently, Baarsma et al. (2012) completed a similar survey for the Dutch antitrust 
authority and confirmed this point regarding the rarity of pro-competitive mergers being 
deterred. Additionally, Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2013) find that changes in the tenor of US 
merger policy affect future horizontal merger activity but do not affect future non-horizontal 
merger activity. Since US authorities almost exclusively target horizontal merger activity as 
potentially anti-competitive, these results also support the idea that merger control does not 
deter anti-competitive mergers. 
While the pre-existing empirical scholarship indicates that anti-competitive mergers are 
principally affected by changes in the tenor of merger control, we can extend our empirical setup 
in two directions so as to provide some additional evidence that this remains the case in the EC 
merger-policy context. First, we can differentiate between low-concentration and high-
concentration industries, as mergers occurring in high-concentration industries are potentially 
more likely to be anti-competitive and impair effective competition in a market. The EC – and 
other antitrust authorities – employs such a logic in its initial-screening process, as it routinely 
clears mergers in low-concentration industries based on industry HHI and the market shares of 
firms, but takes a closer look at mergers notified in high-concentration industries.2 While we 
will differentiate between low-concentration and high-concentration industries via HHI, the 
premise behind this extension is that effective EC merger policy would seemingly be 
                                                            
2 In its horizontal merger guidelines (EC 2004, 6), the EC states that “The overall concentration level in a market may also 
provide useful information about the competitive situation. In order to measure concentration levels, the Commission often 
applies … HHI ... [as the] level of the HHI can give an initial indication of the competitive pressure in the market post-merger.” 
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characterized by merger-policy actions involving a larger deterrence effect in high-concentration 
– as compared to low-concentration – industries.  
Second, we can consider whether it is the horizontal and vertical merger activity considered 
by the EC to be potentially anti-competitive which is principally deterred by EC merger policy. 
Akin to the Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2013) setup, this differentiation takes advantage of the 
fact that EC officials deem certain horizontal and vertical mergers (i.e., non-conglomerate 
activity) to be the population within which anti-competitive mergers can arise, while the EC 
does not consider conglomerate merger activity – and certain types of horizontal and vertical 
merger activity – to generally raise competitive issues. We do, however, face the limitation that 
we can only identify these differences in clearly pro-competitive and potentially anti-
competitive merger activity for a subset (2000-2009) of our data sample. 
 
III. DATA 
The employed data are panel in nature (where each industry sector represents a panel with 
observations from 1990 to 2009) and consist of matching two separate sources. First, the EC’s 
webpage yields data on the frequency and type of notified mergers and the number of merger-
policy actions at the sector-year level of analysis. Second, Thomson Reuter’s Worldscope 
database allows compiling the necessary merger-wave controls at the sector-year level. 
 
A. Merger and Merger Control Data 
The principal source of information derives from the publicly accessible cases published by 
the Directorate-General Competition (DG Comp) of the EC on its webpage.3 The entire history 
of European merger control – from its inception with the 1990 EU merger regulation – is 
                                                            
3 The types of notified mergers, decisions taken, and reports for each of the EC’s decisions can be downloaded from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/simplified_procedure.html. 
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represented in these case files. To better understand the nature of this rich information, it is 
useful to briefly summarize the EC merger-control process. 
Mergers affecting European markets must be notified to the EC when the deal involves an 
EU community-wide dimension.4 As an aside, smaller deals that generate competitive 
implications relevant to the national markets within the 28 Member States of the EU will be 
handled by the NCAs; hence, these are merger-policy proceedings beyond our current scope 
(see Van Waarden and Drahos 2002 for an explanation of European jurisdictional boundaries). 
As represented in Figure 1, the EC has 25 working days in which to make an initial assessment 
after receiving notification of the merger—the so-called ‘phase-1 investigation’. This phase can 
be extended to 35 working days when merging firms submit potential remedies or if Member 
States request (or are requested to) referral of the case. Following this preliminary investigation, 
the EC can clear the proposed merger if it does not significantly impede competition (‘phase-1 
clearance’), or decide to accept remedies proposed by merging firms (‘phase-1 remedy’). This 
occurs when the proposed commitments – e.g., divesting some problematic assets to a 
competitor – would attenuate the anti-competitive issues. The EC can also conclude that the 
proposed concentration raises competition issues that are not solved by the proposed remedies; 
if the case, then the EC initiates a more in-depth analysis (‘phase-2 investigation’). Merging 
parties will also sometimes withdraw their proposed merger during the initial investigation 
phase (‘phase-1 withdrawal’). 
Phase-2 investigations can go for a maximum of 90 working days. After this more detailed 
investigation, the EC can again unconditionally clear the merger (‘phase-2 clearance’), clear the 
merger conditional on commitments (‘phase-2 remedy’), or prohibit the merger (‘phase-2 
                                                            
4 A merger has an EU community dimension if "(i) It takes place between firms with a combined worldwide turnover of at least 
5 billion Euros and, (ii) a turnover within the European Economic Area of more than 250 million Euros for each of at least two 
of the participating firms (unless each merging firm achieves more than 2/3 of its aggregate community turnover within one and 
the same Member State)." (Council Regulation No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004). 
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prohibition’). The merging parties may also withdraw the merger in the second phase (‘phase-2 
withdrawals’). Commentators (e.g., Bergman et al. 2003) have argued that withdrawing a 
merger in the second phase represents a virtual prohibition, as merging parties often formally 
withdraw a merger before an actual prohibition is commuted. For instance, GE’s acquisition of 
Honeywell was officially a phase-2 withdrawal, as the EC’s conditions for allowing the merger 
to proceed represented an ‘effective prohibition’ of the transaction (Clougherty 2005). Given 
that both phase-2 prohibitions and phase-2 withdrawals suggest a failure to find acceptable 
remedies that alleviate anti-competitive concerns, we aggregate phase-2 prohibitions and phase-
2 withdrawals into ‘phase-2 preventions’. Nevertheless, unreported estimations that keep both 
policy instruments separate yield qualitatively-identical results. 
FIGURE 1 
The Timing of European Merger Control 
 
We analyze the first two decades of EC merger control (1990–2009) where a total of 4,284 
mergers were notified to the Commission authorities. We have information on the name of the 
merging firms, the notification date, the type and date of the EC's decision(s), and the main 
industry affected by the merger. Industries are identified with NACE codes: a classification 
scheme used by the EU to categorize economic activities. After the relevant matching and 
selection processes, we have 37 NACE industries covering 1990-2009; thus, our unit of analysis 
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is a particular industry (m) in a particular year (t).5 Table 1 reports the exact definition of our 
measures of merger activity and merger-policy actions. 
TABLE 1 
Definition of the Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
NTmt # of total mergers notified to the EC in industry m in year t 
NAmt # of potentially anti-competitive mergers notified to the EC in industry m in year t 
NPmt # of clearly pro-competitive mergers notified to the EC in industry m in year t 
R1mt
 
# of mergers where remedies are applied in phase-1 in industry m in year t 
W1mt
 
# of mergers withdrawn by the merging firms in phase-1 in industry m in year t 
R2mt
 
# of mergers where remedies are applied in phase-2 in industry m in year t  
P2mt # of preventions (prohibitions plus withdrawals) in phase-2 in industry m in year t 
Sales Growthmt 
Mean of sales growth over a 2-year period for all firms i present in industry m in year 
t (as defined in Andrade and Stafford, 2004): 
ሺݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜௠௧ െ ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜௠௧ିଶሻ ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜௠௧ିଶ⁄  
Share Returnmt 
Mean of annual return on shares for firms i in industry m in year t: 
ሺ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜௠௧ െ ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜௠୲ିଵሻ ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁௜௠୲ିଵ⁄  
Tobins Qmt 
Mean Tobin’s Q for firms i in industry m in year t: 
ୟୱୱୣ୲	୴ୟ୪୳ୣ೔೘౪ା୫ୟ୰୩ୣ୲	୴ୟ୪୳ୣ	ୣ୯୳୧୲୷	೔೘౪ିୠ୭୭୩	୴ୟ୪୳ୣ	ୣ୯୳୧୲୷౟೘౪
ୟୱୱୣ୲	୴ୟ୪୳ୣ೔೘౪ , 
where: 
݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݒ݈ܽݑ݁	݁ݍݑ݅ݐݕ ௜௠௧ ൌ ܿ݋݉݉݋݊ ݏݐ݋ܿ݇ ݋ݑݐݏݐܽ݊݀݅݊݃ ௜௠௧ ൈ ܽݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	݈ܿ݋ݏ݅݊݃	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁	୧௠୲ 
HHImt 
Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index in industry m in year t based on the sales for all firms i 
in industry m in time t: 
ܪܪܫ௠௧ ൌ ෍൬ ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜௠௧ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ௠௧൰
ଶ
௜∈௠
 
Betamt Captured by the time-industry-specific coefficients, ܤ݁ݐܽ୫୲, which are estimates 
from an OLS regression of variable profits on average costs for all firms i within 
industry m in year t: ln π୧୫୲ ൌ α ൅ ܤ݁ݐܽ୫୲ ୡ౟ౣ౪୮౟ౣ౪ ൅ ε୧୫୲. Variable profits are defined as 
π୧୫୲ ൎ sales୧୫୲ െ cost	of	goods	sold୧୫୲, whereas average variable costs are defined 
as  ௖೔೘೟௣೔೘೟ ൌ
௖೔೘೟௤೔೘೟
௣೔೘೟௤೔೘೟ ൎ
௖௢௦௧	௢௙	௚௢௢ௗ௦	௦௢௟ௗ೔೘೟
௦௔௟௘௦೔೘೟ ൌ ܣܸܥ௜௠௧. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the total number of mergers notified to the EC by year for all industries, 
and indicates that merger behavior follows a characteristic wave-like pattern. During the 1990s, 
                                                            
5 Many industries exhibit a complete lack of merger-policy activity. Such industries do not help identify the deterrence effects of 
active enforcement, as deterrence in our framework functions via firms updating their beliefs about the EC’s stance through 
actual changes in merger-policy actions. Therefore, we exclude inactive industries from our analysis by dropping industries 
where we observe 2 or less merger-policy actions over the two decades (1990-2009) of our data sample. 
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the number of merger notifications steadily increased. Yet following the burst in the dotcom 
bubble, we see a reversal in this trend through 2000-2003. Merger activity levels began to rise 
again after 2004 and reached a peak in 2007; though, the number of merger notifications 
indicates a significant downward trend with the financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
FIGURE 2 
Number of Notified Mergers per Year for All Industries 
 
Figure 3 displays the total number of yearly merger-policy actions (Phase-1 Remedies, 
Phase-1 Withdrawals, Phase-2 Remedies, Phase-2 Preventions) taken by the EC: where Actions 
represents the sum of these four policy instruments. The annual levels of merger-policy actions 
appear to correlate to some extent with merger-activity levels; though, we should point out that 
the various merger-policy actions exhibit relatively-low pairwise correlations. Some additional 
factors, however, are seemingly at play in the observed patterns. After the reversal of four 
preventions by the European courts in the early 2000s (GE/Honeywell; Airtours/First Choice; 
Schneider/Legrand; and Tetra Laval/Sidel), both the number of phase-2 preventions and the 
number of phase-2 remedies decrease. Additionally, both phase-1 remedies and phase-1 
withdrawals occur more frequently over the same period. Accordingly, there appears to be some 
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evidence here of a trend whereby EC officials and merging parties are more actively using the 
initial phase of the merger-review process to settle merger cases. This potentially indicates an 
improvement in reaching early agreements, thus suggesting more efficient communication 
between merging firms and the EC. As noted by Lyons (2009, 166), “Reasons for this include 
experience, more written guidance, a more economic approach, and the impact of the Courts.” 
Alternatively, there may be a realization by the EC that they have greater bargaining power in 
phase 1—a topic we take up later in more detail. 
FIGURE 3 
Yearly Merger Policy Actions for All Industries 
 
B. Control Variables 
We follow Andrade et al. (2001) and Harford (2005) by constructing a set of variables that 
have been found to be important drivers of merger waves: the industry-median sales growth 
(Sales Growthmt), the industry-median return on shares (Share Returnmt), and the industry-
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median Tobin’s Q (Tobins Qmt). The three industry-level controls represent primary factors 
influencing merger activity levels. First, Andrade et al. (2001) find that industries with 
substantial sales growth tend to experience greater merger activity levels. Several related 
explanations exist behind this relationship; though in essence, once an economic shock occurs to 
industry sales, the collective reaction of firms is such that assets are reallocated via merger 
activity. Mergers will tend then to cluster in time, as managers simultaneously react to similar 
shocks by competing for the best combinations of assets. Second, industries with higher share 
prices and/or Tobin’s Q ratios (i.e., market-to-book ratios) often indicate greater merger activity 
levels. The motivations behind this relationship come from the so-called misvaluation 
explanations, which tend to build on stock-market overvaluation. Proponents of this rationale 
argue that acquirers with temporarily overvalued shares will tend to exchange these shares for 
assets in undervalued targets; and target shareholders accept such a proposition due to having 
shorter time horizons (Harford 2005; Shleifer and Vishny 2003). 
Table 1 also reports precise descriptions for these three control constructs and for some 
additional control variables. To build these constructs, we use information on European firms 
from Thomson Worldscope databases. Doing so ensures that our firm-level data matches the 
markets affected by the merger activity observed in our sample.6 We aggregate this firm-level 
balance-sheet and income-statement information to the industry-year-level (m,t) and match these 
data with our relevant merger-activity and merger-policy constructs.7  
                                                            
6 We use data from firms broadly defined to include all countries of the European Economic Area, plus Turkey. In particular, we 
include firms located in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Channel Islands, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom.  
7 The primary industries of activity for firms in Worldscope are identified via US SIC codes, while the industry-merger activity is 
categorized according to EU NACE codes. Thus, we match these different industries by using the US census bureau table of 
conversion (http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html). To avoid double counting, we employ a 1 
to 1 matching procedure. However, this conversion table sometimes allocates the same SIC industry into different NACE 
industries. Hence, as a robustness check, we also define the industries via an alternative m to 1 matching procedure and find that 
qualitative results do not change when using this allocation process. This is unsurprising as industry-control variables capture 
broad changes in industry trends—trends which are only partially affected by the possible misallocation of some firms. 
16 
 
In order to account for the competitive conditions in the relevant industries, we construct 
the traditional measure of industry concentration (HHImt). The EC employs HHI as a means to 
initially screen merger cases (EC 2004); that said, HHI does have some shortcomings when it 
comes to measuring competition, as its theoretical foundations are based on quantity 
competition (see Buccirossi et al. 2009, for an overview). Accordingly, we also employ a 
measure of competition developed by Boone (2008) that was empirically operationalized by 
Griffith et al. (2005). This relative-profits measure quantifies the elasticity of a firm’s profits 
with respect to its cost level (Betamt). More negative values of Beta indicate more intense 
competition as firm profits will be more ‘negatively related’ to costs. Boone et al. (2007) show 
that Beta is a reliable construct representing the development of competition for several models 
of competition when markets are oligopolistic. 
Table 2 reports preliminary statistics for our base estimation sample of 637 observations 
over the 1990-2009 period. One caveat, however, is that the statistics for the ‘potentially anti-
competitive’ and ‘clearly pro-competitive’ merger-notification variables are based on the 
smaller estimation sample covering 287 observations over the 2000-2009 period. The number of 
total merger notifications averages 5 per industry year over the full-sample period, while the 
number of ‘potentially anti-competitive’ and ‘clearly pro-competitive’ merger notifications 
respectively average 3.2 and 3.5 per industry year over the 2000-2009 period. As for merger-
policy actions, they occur slightly more than once every two years (0.57 merger-policy actions 
per year on average). Phase-1 remedies represent the most common merger-policy action, 
followed by phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and then by phase-2 preventions. In terms 
of observable industry characteristics, the average HHI is 0.132 though the variance across 
industries is quite large; e.g., 0.751 represents the maximum concentration level. A similar 
pattern of variation across industries can be observed for the Beta constructs. 
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TABLE 2 
Preliminary Statistics 
  
 Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total Merger Notifications 5.176 5.296 0 28 
Potentially Anti-competitive Merger Notifications 3.207 3.358 0 15 
Clearly Pro-competitive Merger Notifications 3.542 3.418 0 22 
P1 Remedies 0.259 0.569 0 3 
P1 Withdrawals 0.143 0.388 0 3 
P2 Remedies 0.116 0.379 0 3 
P2 Preventions 0.055 0.248 0 2 
HHI 0.132 0.123 0.013 0.751 
Beta -2.157 3.246 -27.229 23.743 
Sales Growth  (yearly mean) 0.156 0.293 -0.715 1.785 
Tobin’s Q (yearly mean) 4.161 34.727 0.382 853.553 
Share Return (yearly mean) 0.130 0.407 -0.574 5.790 
 
IV. ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
A. Main Analysis 
Our aim is to investigate the deterrence effects involved with the various EC merger-policy 
actions; thus, we study the impact of these actions on the proclivity of firms to engage in future 
merger activity at the industry level. Given that mergers in the European context manifest in 
wave-like patterns, we follow the empirical approach of Seldeslachts et al. (2009) and 
Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2013) to hold the merger wave constant in order to elicit 
deterrence effects. With this empirical approach, holding the merger wave constant allows 
measuring deterrence via foregone merger activity. Specifically, foregone merger activity is 
represented by the departure in actual merger activity levels from what the merger wave would 
otherwise predict. In essence, the merger wave sets the essential counterfactual (what would 
merger activity be like in the absence of a change in the tenor of merger policy) via which 
deterrence can be captured. In order to ensure that we have a well-specified merger wave, we 
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will control for the wave via a variety of means: year fixed effects, lagged dependent constructs, 
and control variables from the finance literature on merger waves. 
First, we include year dummy variables in order to capture economy-wide period-specific 
shocks which are common across industries and can trigger macro-level merger waves. In 
addition, our regression specifications will employ industry-level dummy variables in order to 
control for time-invariant industry-specific heterogeneity in merger behavior. Second, we 
include lagged dependent variables as right-hand side regressors; hence, past merger-activity 
levels partly explain current merger-activity levels. 
Third, we include relevant measures that capture time-varying industry factors that explain 
merger-activity levels as indicated by the above-mentioned scholarship in finance economics. 
While much of the research in economics has failed to consider merger activity in its proper 
wave-like context, research in finance has advanced our understanding of merger waves (e.g., 
Harford 2005). In particular, the finance literature found that both economic and financial 
factors – such as sales growth, return on shares, Tobin’s Q, and even industry concentration – 
tend to drive merger activity at the industry level. Our methodological approach builds upon this 
literature, as we take the wave-like nature of merger activity in our analysis explicitly into 
account by controlling for these industry-level drivers of merger-activity levels. 
In sum, our methodological approach explicitly takes the wave-like nature of merger 
activity into account. By doing so, we can empirically capture deterrence (i.e., forsaken merger 
activity), as being the departure in merger-activity levels from those levels that would otherwise 
be predicted by the merger wave. The proper setting of the merger wave allows us then to 
establish the pivotal counter-factual: what would merger-activity levels be like in the absence of 
a change in the tenor of EC merger policy. With the above in mind, our first set of empirical 
tests focuses on investigating whether specific merger-policy actions generate deterrence effects. 
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By considering in detail how different merger-policy instruments affect future merger-activity 
levels, we can also investigate the implications of shifting from one merger-policy instrument 
towards other instruments. Such substitutions between instruments may also impact deterrence, 
as different merger-policy tools send different signals to firms about the toughness of the 
antitrust authority.  
Accordingly, we estimate the following regression specification: 
݈݊ ܰ ௠ܶ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݈݊ܰ ௠ܶ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶ݈݊ܰ ௠ܶ௧ିଶ ൅ߚଵ݈ܴ݊1௠௧ିଵ൅ߚଶ݈ܹ݊1௠௧ିଵ൅ߚଷ݈ܴ݊2௠௧ିଵ 
																൅ߚସ݈݊ܲ2௠௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܺ௠௧ିଵ ൅ ߟ௠ ൅ ߟ௧ ൅ ߝ௠௧      (1), 
where m refers to industry (the 37 NACEs) and t refers to time (the year). Further, NT represents 
the number of total merger notifications, R1 represents the total number of Phase-1 Remedies, 
W1 represents the total number of Phase-1 Withdrawals, R2 represents the total number of 
Phase-2 Remedies, P2 represents the total number of Phase-2 Preventions, and X represents the 
vector of industry-specific characteristics. The terms ࣁ࢓ and ࣁ࢚	represent industry and time 
fixed-effects, respectively. Thus in addition to a base estimation via OLS, we will estimate our 
regression specification by employing a fixed-effects estimation method. In addition, extensive 
testing indicates that a model with two lagged dependent variables best captures merger waves 
in our data—a finding in line with precedents in the literature (Seldeslachts et al. 2009; 
Clougherty and Seldeslachts 2013). We will also correct the error term ࢿ࢓࢚	 by clustering at the 
industry level. Assuming clustered standard errors over the panel mitigates to an extent any 
remaining serial correlation in the merger series, and also represents the preferred practice in the 
deterrence literature (Donohue and Wolfers 2005). 
We lag the specific merger-policy action variables and the industry control constructs by 
one year for two reasons. First, this helps ensure that the explanatory variables precede the 
dependent variable. Second, it remedies to some extent the potential endogeneity of the 
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explanatory variables due to simultaneity bias; e.g., industry concentration may go up due to 
increased levels of merger activity. More specifically, Bar-Gill and Harel (2001) note that the 
dependent variable in a deterrence context can influence expected sanctions. Thus, merger-
policy variables potentially involve simultaneity-based endogeneity since merger-policy actions 
are a likely function of the number of notified mergers. Accordingly, we follow best practices in 
the deterrence literature where scholars have begun to lag the deterrence variables to mitigate 
endogeneity issues (e.g. Katz et al. 2003).8  
In addition to considering the one-year lag for our merger-policy variables, we will also 
consider a lagged two-year average for these variables. Previous empirical work on deterrence 
effects and merger policy (Davies and Majumdar 2002; Seldeslachts et al. 2009; Clougherty and 
Seldeslachts 2013) convincingly argues that merger-policy actions are characterized by a two-
year window in which they affect the actions of firms in subsequent years. Accordingly, we will 
also consider the merger-policy activity taking place in year’s t-1 and t-2 as potentially affecting 
merger behavior in year t.  
Finally, we will log-transform our merger frequency and merger-policy variables in order to 
yield additional estimation advantages. In particular, Donohue and Wolfers (2005) argue that the 
consideration of scaling issues is essential when measuring deterrence, and the merger-policy 
deterrence studies by Seldeslachts et al. (2009) and Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2013) follow 
through on this advice by employing log-transformations of any count variables employed in 
regression specifications. It should also be noted that by employing the log of the absolute 
number for the specific merger-policy action variables, our regression specification departs 
                                                            
8 Although lagging our explanatory variables eliminates correlation with contemporaneous error terms and substantially reduces 
the potential for bias in these coefficient estimates, lagged variables may still be potentially correlated with past error terms. If the 
case, then lagged explanatory variables are ‘predetermined’ which is less of a problem as compared to having endogenous 
variables. Predetermined variables can also potentially yield biased coefficient estimates (Bond 2002), but they are characterized 
by far less bias than do endogenous variables, as is extensively shown in Arellano (2003). 
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slightly from the conditional probabilities setup indicative of many empirical studies of 
deterrence that follow Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973). However, the EC institutional 
framework – with merger-policy actions manifesting in both phase-1 and phase-2 – does not 
provide the appropriate context in which to employ a conditional probabilities approach. 
Furthermore, constructing conditional probabilities would generate a linked variable in the 
construction of both the left-hand-side and right-hand-side variables; i.e., the number of notified 
mergers would show up both in the dependent variable and in the initial merger-policy variable. 
As is extensively argued – first by Klein et al. (1978) and more recently by Donohue and 
Wolfers (2005) – any measurement error in these linked variables could potentially lead to 
biased coefficient estimates that would favor empirically finding deterrence effects. 
By using count measures for our merger-policy variables, we adopt the approach for 
measuring the deterrence variables employed by Seldeslachts et al. (2009) in their study of cross-
jurisdictional deterrence. Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (2007) also argue for employing policy-action 
counts in deterrence frameworks and for considering spikes in these actions to be communication 
factors – or announcement effects – that signal public-policy shifts. In addition, there has been 
considerable debate within the ‘economics of crime’ literature as to whether conditional 
probabilities or announcement effects are the appropriate approach to measuring deterrence 
variables. Berk (2005) notes that complicating matters by adjusting and/or altering how the use 
of a policy instrument (e.g., mergers that are prevented) enters an empirical analysis of 
deterrence is not a sound strategy, as additional flawed measures for a normalizing denominator 
can bring about faulty measurement and over-fitting risks. Thus, a count measure of merger-
policy actions is far less sensitive according to this perspective. A number of empirical papers in 
the deterrence literature follow this advice to employing count measures for the different policy 
actions (e.g., Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd 2006; Shepherd 2004; Grogger 1990); hence, our 
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approach to measuring the deterrence constructs rests on precedents from the ‘economics of 
crime’ literature. 
 
B. Analysis of High and Low Concentration Industries 
Our next step involves extending our basic model in order to differentiate between high-
concentration and low-concentration industries—a distinction which allows investigating 
whether EC merger policy generates greater deterrence in high-concentration industries. To do 
so, we separate industries into those that have HHI’s above (for high concentration) and below 
(for low concentration) a 0.2 cutoff point. This is the threshold employed by the EC as mergers 
in industries with HHIs above this threshold tend to be subjected to heavy scrutiny by the 
Commission. For instance, the EC generally challenges mergers in high-concentration industries 
even if the HHI increase is relatively small. Given that this EC-defined threshold is also known 
to the population of firms, it is a natural benchmark to separate the industries into high and low 
concentration for the purposes of studying EC merger policy. Thus, the 0.2 HHI-threshold 
should represent the perceptions of firms (both merging and non-merging) when considering 
what constitutes a low or high concentration industry.  
Most importantly, effective employment of EC merger-policy instruments would seemingly 
lead to relatively large deterrence in high-concentration industries and minimal deterrence in 
low-concentration industries. To follow through on these conjectures regarding varied 
deterrence effects in high- and low-concentration industries, we will undertake fixed-effects 
regressions that are identical to the specification represented by equation 1. These regressions, 
however, will be estimated separately for the two different sub-samples (low and high 
concentration) of industries. Akin to the main-analysis estimations, we will also consider both a 
one-year lag and a lagged two-year average for the merger-policy variables. 
23 
 
 
C. Analysis of Potentially Anti-competitive & Clearly Pro-competitive Merger Notifications 
In addition to considering high- and low-concentration industries, we can also take into 
account the different types of mergers which are notified to EC authorities. While conglomerate 
mergers have traditionally gone unscrutinized by EC authorities for anti-competitive concerns, 
horizontal and vertical mergers have been considered to potentially involve anti-competitive 
effects (Motta 2004). Nevertheless, the EC is cognizant that a large number of horizontal and 
vertical transactions will also be pro-competitive in nature. Since 2000, the EC has allowed 
‘simplified procedures’ for those merger notifications which are very likely to be pro-
competitive in nature. In particular, conglomerate mergers are notified under this procedure. 
Furthermore, certain types of horizontal mergers (where the merging parties have less than a 
20% market share) and vertical mergers (where the merging parties have less than a 30% market 
share in both the upstream and downstream markets) are allowed to go through a simplified 
procedure.9  
We gathered information then on the number of merger notifications to the EC that were 
processed via the simplified procedures, as these transactions can be considered as clearly pro-
competitive from the EC’s standpoint. Furthermore, those vertical and horizontal mergers which 
were notified outside of the simplified procedures can be considered as potentially anti-
competitive transactions from the EC’s standpoint. We should underscore that many of the 
vertical and horizontal mergers that are notified outside of the simplified procedures will 
ultimately be pro-competitive in nature; however, this is the population of merger activity in 
which anti-competitive mergers will arise according to the EC. Effective EC merger-policy 
                                                            
9 For an explanation of the EC’s simplified procedures please see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013XC1214%2802%29&from=EN 
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would tend to deter the horizontal and vertical activities where anti-competitive transactions 
may arise and would tend to not deter the clearly pro-competitive activities where anti-
competitive effects are unlikely to arise. Moreover, we can build upon the above idea that 
effective deterrence will generally take place in high-concentration industries as opposed to low-
concentration industries. Thus, in addition to considering whether it is the potentially anti-
competitive transactions which are principally deterred by the employment of merger-policy 
actions, we can also consider whether EC merger-policy actions principally deter the potentially 
anti-competitive transactions taking place in high-concentration industries as opposed to low-
concentration industries. 
This more-precise information regarding the type of mergers notified to the EC was only 
available for the 2000-2009 period, as it was only during that period that the EC allowed for the 
‘simplified procedures’ which enable differentiating between clearly pro-competitive and 
potentially anti-competitive transactions. Thus, we can employ this data in order to create two 
additional dependent constructs: the number of potentially anti-competitive notifications, and 
the number of clearly pro-competitive merger notifications. Furthermore, it is the potentially 
anti-competitive mergers which should be principally affected by the employment of merger-
policy tools, and this should be even more the case in high-concentration industries.  
To follow through on these priors regarding the deterrence of anti-competitive and pro-
competitive mergers in high- and low-concentration industries, we will undertake regressions 
that conform to the previous estimations by again employing fixed-effects estimations 
conducted on both low- and high-concentration industry sub-samples. Yet instead of employing 
the number of total merger notifications as the dependent variable, we will employ the number 
of potentially anti-competitive and the number of clearly pro-competitive merger notifications as 
the respective dependent constructs. For purposes of brevity, we will furthermore restrict our 
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analysis to the lagged two-year average for the different merger-policy action variables, as the 
precedents in the deterrence literature (e.g., Seldeslachts et al. 2009; Clougherty and 
Seldeslachts 2013) indicate the appropriateness of such an approach.  
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Main Results 
Table 3 reports the empirical results for four regression estimations – OLS and fixed-effects 
estimations for both one-year and two-year lags of the merger-policy variables – of the base 
specification where we consider the deterrence effects generated by the various merger-policy 
actions. Before considering our variables of principal interest, we first discuss the 
appropriateness of our estimation models and the relevance of the control variables. For all three 
specifications, the lagged dependent variables – as well as some of the merger-wave control 
variables – appear to affect merger activity in subsequent years and indicate the expected signs. 
Hence, our empirical set-up appears to be appropriate as it accounts for the wave-like pattern in 
merger behavior. In particular, the two lagged dependent variables for merger-activity levels 
appear to be relevant: the first lagged dependent variable is positive and significant in all four 
estimations; the second lagged dependent variable is positive and significant in the OLS 
estimations. Moreover, the inclusion of two autoregressive terms is appropriate as the test for 
serial correlation in the error term performs better with the inclusion of a second lag. Of the 
three merger-wave control variables (sales growth, Tobin’s Q, and share return), share return 
appears to yield the most robust effect on future merger-activity levels—a positive and 
significant effect in all four estimations, which provides tentative support for misvaluation 
theories of merger behavior. However, our competition measures (HHI and Beta) generally 
indicate insignificant effects on merger-activity levels, though HHI is negative and significant in 
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the OLS estimations. The general insignificance of these competition measures may be due to 
the fact that industries are quite heterogeneous in terms of competitiveness—an issue we discuss 
in more detail when considering sub-samples of low- and high-concentration industries. 
TABLE 3 
Main Regression Specification 
   OLS OLS Fixed-Effects Fixed-Effects 
  One-year lag  Lagged two-year average One-year lag  Lagged two-year average 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Merger Notifications t-1 0.416*** 0.400*** 0.124** 0.0978* 
(0.036) (0.0360) (0.0531) (0.0522) 
Total Merger Notifications t-2 0.324*** 0.330*** 0.0278 0.0237 
(0.041) (0.0431) (0.0548) (0.0519) 
P1 Remedies t-1 -0.150** -0.138* -0.161*** -0.174* 
(0.056) (0.0756) (0.0510) (0.0884) 
P1 Withdrawals t-1 -0.012 -0.00480 -0.0395 0.0154 
(0.098) (0.130) (0.0748) (0.106) 
P2 Remedies t-1 0.014 0.0780 0.0802 0.253* 
(0.108) (0.119) (0.0972) (0.137) 
P2 Preventions t-1 0.030 0.0974 0.0323 0.102 
(0.148) (0.125) (0.120) (0.129) 
HHI t-1 -0.533** -0.530** 0.364 0.372 
(0.254) (0.255) (0.356) (0.359) 
Beta t-1 (x 100) -0.896 -0.902 -0.975 -0.931 
(0.905) (0.929) (0.768) (0.747) 
Sales Growth t-1 (x 10) -0.095 -0.090 0.168 0.141 
(0.387) (0.388) (0.453) (0.464) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 (x 100) -0.007 -0.009 -0.056** -0.060* 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) 
Share Return t-1 0.126** 0.123** 0.120*** 0.112** 
(0.051) (0.053) (0.0434) (0.043) 
Constant	 0.522*** 0.532*** 1.552*** 1.596*** 
(0.114) (0.111) (0.164) (0.154) 
Observations 637 637 637 637 
R-squared 0.610 0.609 0.464 0.466 
Notes: Columns 1 & 2 report OLS regression results. Column 3 & 4 report the results from a panel fixed-effect regression. Columns 1 & 3 
report results for the specification where the explanatory variables are defined as the lagged values over the previous year. Columns 2 & 
4 report the results for the specifications where the explanatory variables are defined as lagged average values over the previous two 
years. The dependent and merger-policy action variables are expressed in logs. In all regressions, we include year fixed-effects. We 
report heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the industry level in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
is represented by ***,**,* respectively. For the fixed-effects estimates in columns 2 & 4, we report the within R-square. 
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We can now consider the empirical results while focusing on the variables of principal 
interest: the relationship between the various merger-policy tools and future merger activity 
levels. First, phase-1 remedies indicate a statistically-significant negative impact on future 
merger-activity levels in all four estimations. Phase-1 remedies are unique, however, in that 
none of the other merger-policy action variables indicate any consistent statistically-significant 
deterrence effects across the four estimations. The consistent negative impact of the phase-1 
remedies variable suggests that increasing the number of remedies in the initial stage of merger 
control leads to reduced merger activity levels in subsequent years. This suggests that a spike in 
the relative use of this particular merger-policy instrument tends to send a clear signal to firms 
that the EC will be tougher in the application of merger policy in the future.10 In terms of 
economic significance, if one were to take the coefficient estimate for phase-1 remedies from the 
fourth estimation (-0.174) and consider the impact of a 1% increase in the application of that 
merger-policy action, then merger activity would tend to decrease in subsequent years by about 
0.175% in a focal industry. In terms of a levels interpretation, the application of an additional 
phase-1 remedy will, on average, lead to almost one less merger notification per year in 
subsequent years.  
 
B. Results for Low versus High Concentration Industries   
Table 4 reports the empirical results for four fixed-effects estimations that involve sub-
sampling between low- and high-concentration industries. While the base regression 
specification is still employed, the first two columns present estimation results where the 
merger-policy variables are respectively defined while employing one-year lags and lagged two-
                                                            
10 When we alter the form of the merger-policy variables to simple dummy constructs that capture whether a particular merger-policy action was applied or not (so 
irrespective of how many times these actions were applied) in the previous year (or two-year) period, we get empirical results largely in line with these results. 
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year averages for the sample of low-concentration industries. Furthermore, the later-two 
columns present estimation results where the merger-policy variables are again respectively 
defined with one-year lags and lagged two-year averages but for the sample of high-
concentration industries. For brevity, we will focus on the variables of principal interest: the 
relationship between the various merger-policy tools and future merger activity levels in low- 
and high-concentration industries.  
As can be seen from the four Table 4 estimations, phase-1 remedies tend to reduce merger-
activity levels in both high- and low-concentration industries as the coefficient estimate for 
phase-1 remedies is negative throughout and statistically significant in three out of the four 
estimations. However, deterrence effects appear to be greatest in high-concentration industries, 
as the respective one-year-lag and lagged two-year average coefficient estimates (-0.282 and -
0.504) for phase-1 remedies in high-concentration industries are significantly different when 
compared with the respective coefficient estimates (-0.098 and -0.103) for phase-1 remedies in 
low-concentration industries. If one were to take the coefficient estimate for phase-1 remedies 
from the fourth estimation (-0.504) and consider the impact of a 1% increase in the application 
of that merger-policy action in high-concentration industries, then merger activity would tend to 
decrease in subsequent years by a little over 0.5% in such industries. In terms of a levels 
interpretation, the application of an additional phase-1 remedy will, on average, lead in 
subsequent years to 2.5 fewer merger notifications per year in high-concentration industries. 
We can also consider the empirical results for the other merger-policy variables across the 
four estimations in Table 4. Striking from a review of these results is that none of these variables 
indicate a consistently significant deterrence effect across the four regression specifications. 
Only phase-2 preventions appears to indicate a statistically robust effect in high-concentration 
industries; however, the impact of phase-2 preventions on future merger activity in high-
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concentration industries is found to be positive—a surprising result. This counterintuitive 
finding likely represents a statistical artifact as there were only seven phase-2 preventions that 
manifested over the 1990-2009 period within highly-concentrated industries. 
TABLE 4 
Deterrence in Low- and High-Concentration Industries 
Low-Concentration Low-Concentration High-Concentration High-Concentration 
 
One-year lag 
 
(1) 
Lagged two-year 
average 
(2) 
One-year lag 
 
(3) 
Lagged two-year 
average 
(4 ) 
Total Merger Notifications t-1 0.092 0.064 0.024 -0.039 
(0.061) (0.059) (0.108) (0.109) 
Total Merger Notifications t-2 0.048 0.037 -0.249*** -0.224** 
(0.058) (0.052) (0.096) (0.101) 
P1 Remedies t-1 -0.098* -0.103 -0.282* -0.504** 
(0.056) (0.101) (0.158) (0.210) 
P1 Withdrawals t-1 -0.042 0.051 0.118 -0.106 
(0.077) (0.108) (0.234) (0.265) 
P2 Remedies t-1 0.123 0.293* 0.209 0.548 
(0.091) (0.153) (0.362) (0.411) 
P2 Preventions t-1 -0.065 -0.008 0.713** 0.970* 
(0.118) (0.125) (0.315) (0.505) 
HHI t-1 -1.327 -1.413 0.420 0.465 
(0.891) (0.930) (0.607) (0.600) 
Beta t-1 (x 100) -0.757 -0.742 -0.604 0.041 
(1.010) (0.971) (1.142) (1.203) 
Sales Growth t-1 (x 10) 0.145** 0.133* -0.035 -0.026 
(0.074) (0.077) (0.045) (0.046) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 (x 100) 0.300*** 0.315*** -0.101** -0.106*** 
(0.057) (0.059) (0.042) (0.027) 
Share Return t-1 0.116 0.117 0.096* 0.109** 
(0.073) (0.075) (0.053) (0.044) 
Constant  0.356* 0.684*** 1.203* 1.013 
(0.193) (0.181) (0.655) (0.684) 
Observations 532 532 105 105 
R-squared 0.7148 0.7133 0.6688 0.6696 
Notes: We estimate these models via a sandwich estimator to account for co-variances between industries and to compare the impact of high- versus low-
competition industries. We report the coefficient estimates from a panel fixed-effects regression. Columns 1 and 3 report results for specifications where the 
merger-policy variables are defined as the lagged values for the previous year. Columns 2 and 4 report the results for specifications where the merger-policy 
variables are defined as the lagged average over the previous two years. The dependent variable is the log of merger notifications, and the merger-policy 
variables are also expressed in logs. In all of the estimations, we include year fixed-effects. The threshold for high versus low concentration industries is an 
HHI of 0.2 (the EC’s threshold in defining a concentrated-market). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported in 
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels is represented by ***,**,*.  
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The fact that phase-1 remedies are characterized by greater deterrence in high-concentration 
industries as compared to low-concentration industries is indeed encouraging, as it indicates that 
deterrence effects manifest where they are probably most desirable. Since high-concentration 
industries are more likely to involve merger transactions that significantly impair effective 
competition, it would seem appropriate that high-concentration industries would be most 
influenced by changes in the tenor of EC merger policy. Furthermore, these results provide 
some credibility for our methodological approach, as the results are consistent with the idea that 
it is anti-competitive mergers which are principally deterred by the existence of merger policy. 
Furthermore, these results provide additional evidence that it is phase-1 remedies which 
uniquely yield deterrence in the EC antitrust context. 
 
C. Results for Potentially Anti-competitive and Clearly Pro-competitive Notifications 
Table 5 reports the empirical results for four fixed-effects estimations that estimate the 
impact of merger-policy instruments on the proclivity of firms to offer up potentially anti-
competitive and clearly pro-competitive transactions in subsequent years while also sub-
sampling between low- and high-concentration industries. The first two columns present the 
respective results for the low- and high-concentration samples where the number of pro-
competitive transactions represents the dependent construct. Furthermore, the later-two columns 
present the respective results for the low- and high-concentration samples where the number of 
anti-competitive transactions represents the dependent construct. While the more restrictive data 
on pro- and anti-competitive transactions leads to significantly fewer observations, the 
regression specifications are still reasonably well specified, as the R-squares range from 0.55 to 
0.74. For brevity, we again follow precedent and simply present results that focus on lagged 
two-year averages for the merger-policy variables. 
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TABLE 5 
Anti-competitive and Pro-competitive Mergers in High- and Low-
Concentration Industries 
 Pro-competitive Pro-competitive Anti-competitive Anti-Competitive 
 Low-Concentration High-Concentration Low-Concentration High-Concentration
Pro-/Anti-Competitive Notifications t-1 -0.291*** -0.272 -0.115 -0.083 
(0.081) (0.184) (0.194) (0.156) 
Pro-/Anti-Competitive Notifications t-2 -0.177** -0.116 -0.464*** -0.284*** 
(0.078) (0.178) (0.123) (0.0838) 
P1 Remedies t-1 -0.076 -0.311 -0.177 -0.946*** 
(0.135) (0.195) (0.203) (0.338) 
P1 Withdrawals t-1 -0.005 -0.182 -0.343 -1.270*** 
(0.137) (0.392) (0.321) (0.451) 
P2 Remedies t-1 0.076 0.277 -1.199** 0.483 
(0.257) (0.754) (0.585) (0.475) 
P2 Preventions t-1 0.168 0.0612 1.432*** 1.968*** 
(0.251) (0.573) (0.391) (0.661) 
HHI t-1 -3.260 0.0483 0.745 0.479 
(3.143) (0.471) (0.729) (0.676) 
Beta t-1 (x 10) 0.188 0.113 0.150*** 0.211** 
(0.258) (0.110) (0.052) (0.104) 
Sales Growth t-1 (x 10) -0.527* 0.0157 0.113 0.102 
(0.281) (0.136) (0.077) (0.135) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 (x 100) 0.058 -0.178*** -0.019 0.022 
(0.048) (0.028) (0.042) (0.040) 
Share Return t-1 -0.023 0.174*** 0.235** 0.154* 
(0.117) (0.042) (0.095) (0.083) 
Constant  0.936* 1.927*** 0.539* 0.977** 
(0.538) (0.592) (0.321) (0.383) 
Observations 230 57 230 57 
R-squared 0.6773 0.7385 0.5555 0.733 
Notes: We estimate these models via a sandwich estimator to account for co-variances between industries and to compare the impact of high- versus low-
competition industries. We report the coefficient estimates from a panel fixed-effects regression. We report the specifications where the explanatory 
variables are defined as the lagged average values over the previous two years. The dependent variable is the log of merger notifications, and all the merger-
policy action variables are expressed in logs. In all of the estimations, we include year fixed-effects. The threshold for high vs. low competition industries is 
0.2 (the EC’s threshold in defining a concentrated-market) for the case of the HHI construct. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the 
industry level are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels is represented by ***,**,*.  
 
The empirical results for the first two columns – where the impact of merger-policy actions 
on the frequencies of pro-competitive notifications in future years is considered – provide results 
that are in line with effective EC merger policy. Both in low-concentration and high-
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concentration industries, the application of merger-policy instruments does not appear to 
significantly affect the frequencies of pro-competitive mergers in subsequent years. In other 
words, none of the merger-policy instruments (phase-1 remedies, phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 
remedies, and phase-2 preventions) yield deterrence in terms of pro-competitive transactions. 
These empirical results are consistent with the idea that harmless pro-competitive mergers are 
not affected by changes in the tenor of EC merger policy since these are in fact not the merger 
types which EC officials might have concerns. Put differently, these results suggest that EC 
merger policy does not yield over-deterrence.  
The empirical results for the later-two columns – where the impact of merger-policy actions 
on the frequencies of anti-competitive notifications in future years is considered – also yield 
results that are generally in line with our previous findings. In particular, the application of 
phase-1 remedies in high-concentration industries leads to fewer merger notifications of 
potentially anti-competitive transactions in subsequent years. If one were to take the coefficient 
estimate for phase-1 remedies from the fourth estimation (-0.946) and consider the impact of a 
1% increase in phase-1 remedies, then anti-competitive merger activity in high-concentration 
industries would tend to decrease in subsequent years by almost 1% in a focal industry. In terms 
of a levels interpretation, the application of an additional phase-1 remedy in high-concentration 
industries will, on average, lead in subsequent years to some 3 fewer ‘potentially anti-
competitive’ merger notifications per year. 
This finding is line with our previous findings concerning the unique ability of phase-1 
remedies to generate substantial deterrence effects. However, the application of phase-1 
withdrawals in high-concentration industries also leads to fewer merger notifications of 
potentially anti-competitive transactions in subsequent years. While this result is not robust 
across the previous specifications – unlike phase-1 remedies – it does suggest that phase-1 
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withdrawals may yield some deterrence. In addition, we again elicit the spurious result 
concerning the application of phase-2 preventions in high-concentration industries leading to 
more merger notifications of potentially anti-competitive transactions in subsequent years. As 
previously noted, this result is most likely a statistical artifact due to the extremely low number 
of preventions in our sampled period (only two preventions were present in this smaller data 
sample). 
While keeping in mind that these estimations are based on a limited set of observations due 
to data restrictions, the empirical results – which consider the impact of the different merger-
policy actions on future levels of clearly pro-competitive and potentially anti-competitive 
merger transactions in both low-concentration and high-concentration industries – are in line 
with our previous empirical findings. In particular, the deterrence effects due to the application 
of phase-1 remedies are again born out, as phase-1 remedies lead to fewer notifications of 
potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries. If EC merger policy were 
to be effective, the deterrence of anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries 
would be the realm where it would seemingly be most beneficial to generate deterrence via 
changes in the tenor of merger policy. Thus, we again provide some evidence that phase-1 
remedies appear to generate deterrence where it would be most desirable to do so. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS & POLICY DISCUSSION 
We set out here to investigate the deterrence effects generated by EC merger control. In 
particular, our aim was to uncover which specific merger-policy instruments lead to forgone 
merger activity in subsequent years. The striking and consistent finding from our empirical 
results is that phase-1 remedies appear to uniquely generate robust deterrence in the European 
context. Furthermore, preventions, phase-2 remedies, and phase-1 withdrawals do not appear to 
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yield substantial deterrence effects. Several potential related explanations exist as to why phase-
1 remedies yield significant deterrence while phase-2 remedies and the other merger-policy 
instruments do not.  
First, it is possible that the EC has higher bargaining power in the initial stage of the 
merger-review process when merging firms are relatively eager to reach a deal in order to avoid 
the costs of waiting longer for the consummation of the merger in a second phase of the review 
process. As Clougherty (2005) notes, a delay represents a holdup to the intended strategy of the 
merging firms; hence, higher levels of scrutiny that push off the benefits of the transaction 
reflect higher costs for merging firms. Salop (2013) also argues that delays are costly as they 
increase the likelihood of failure for merging firms. Given that merging firms have a substantial 
interest in getting their transaction approved as quickly as possible, they are likely then to agree 
to relatively substantial remedies in the initial stages of the merger-review process so as to avoid 
a prolonged review in the second phase (Dertwinkel-Kalt and Wey 2012). Following this logic, 
the remedies agreed to during the initial stage should be remedies that involve a substantial cost 
to merging parties. Thus, an uptick in these phase-1 remedies will represent a significant 
deterrent to future merger activity, as non-merging firms will update their priors regarding the 
probability of incurring such costly remedies. 
Phase-2 remedies, however, do not indicate significant deterrence in our various regression 
estimations. This result could be based on a similar logic regarding the bargaining-power of the 
EC. But in this case, once a merger has reached the second phase of the merger-review process, 
much less scope exists for the EC to delay the merger’s onset. Instead, the EC’s only recourse in 
the second stage is to threaten a potential prohibition; i.e., if the merging parties fail to agree on 
a remedy that alleviates the EC’s anti-competitive concerns, then the EC could attempt to block 
the merger. However, the EC – and other antitrust-policy authorities – rarely employ 
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prohibitions as a policy instrument; e.g., Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2013) find only 0.072% 
of notified mergers receive a prohibition in the US context. Not only are prohibitions rare events 
in the cross-national context for antitrust, but they have become increasingly rare in the 
European context. In fact, the EC has been reluctant to employ prohibitions as a merger policy 
tool after the court setbacks of the early 2000s.11 In essence, engaging in prohibitions became 
politically unfeasible after the European courts ruled against the EC’s preventions of the 
GE/Honeywell, Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Sidel mergers.  
The EC’s bargaining power might then be severely curtailed in the secondary phase due to 
the absence of prohibitions as a viable option; i.e., threats by the EC to prohibit a merger would 
seemingly be assessed by merging firms as non-credible. Thus, drawn-out negotiations that get 
close to the 90-day deadline in the secondary phase might tend to find substantially-diminished 
EC bargaining power. The only ‘real’ option in these later stages of the merger-review process 
is for the EC to accept the less-substantial remedies being offered by merging firms.12 
Moreover, less-substantial remedies in the secondary phase are, in turn, less likely to represent a 
deterrent to future merger activity. In line with these priors, Duso et al. (2011) find that remedies 
negotiated by the EC in the first phase tend to be more effective at reducing the probability of 
anti-competitive mergers materializing as compared to remedies negotiated in the second phase.  
In addition to phase-2 remedies, phase-1 withdrawals and phase-2 preventions also do not 
generate substantial deterrence according to our empirical results. The fact that preventions do 
not yield deterrence seems somewhat surprising, as preventions impose the highest possible cost 
on merging firms. Yet, the fact that preventions have been seldom employed over the last twenty 
years by the EC potentially explains our inability to detect significant deterrence for this merger-
                                                            
11 In recent years, the EC has increased its employment of prohibitions, though these years are not included in our sample period. 
12 In conversations we had with EC officials, they confirmed the intuition that they felt they had greater bargaining power in first-
phase as compared to the second-phase.  
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policy instrument. Furthermore, the lack of robust deterrence for phase-1 withdrawals may be 
due to the fact that withdrawals do not send a clear signal about the EC’s stance in that 
particular industry. In particular, a number of withdrawals in the first phase may be due to 
reasons internal to the merging parties—rationales that are independent of EC merger policy. 
Accordingly, an up-tick in the number of phase-1 withdrawals could very well be a noisy signal 
that does not provide clear information to firms about the actual costs incurred in navigating the 
merger-review process. As such, the lack of clear deterrence effects for this merger-policy 
instrument makes intuitive sense.  
In terms of policy prescriptions, our results indicate that maximizing deterrence – at least 
according to the current EC merger-policy regime – requires the use of phase-1 remedies. Phase-
1 remedies should be applied relatively frequently, as this is simply the only merger-policy 
instrument which appears togenerate robust deterrence. From a deterrence perspective, it is then 
reassuring that phase-1 remedies are employed more than twice as frequently as phase-2 
remedies. Furthermore, the application of more preventions in the second phase of the merger-
review process may lead to greater deterrence effects for phase-2 remedies via direct and 
indirect channels. First, an increase in preventions would impose the highest possible cost upon 
merging firms; thus, increased employment of this merger-policy tool would seemingly enhance 
direct deterrence. Second, if firms believe that preventions are a relatively likely outcome when 
negotiations break down in the second phase, then these firms would perhaps be more willing to 
accept tougher phase-2 remedies. Thus, establishing prohibitions as a viable option for EC 
merger policy may enhance the EC’s bargaining power in the second phase which would 
indirectly lead to enhanced deterrence for phase-2 remedies. The recent turn in EC merger 
policy to re-embrace the application of preventions (Aegean Airlines/Olympic Air in 2011; 
Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext in 2012; TNT Express/UPS in 2013; and Ryanair/Air Lingus in 
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2013) would seemingly be a healthy practice in terms of generating enhanced deterrence both 
directly and indirectly via phase-2 remedies. 
We also find that the deterrence effects generated by phase-1 remedies work best in high-
concentration industries: where the HHI is above 0.2, the cut-off level employed by the EC in 
order to define an industry as highly concentrated. Furthermore, we find that phase-1 remedies 
do not deter future notifications of clearly pro-competitive mergers in both high- and low-
concentration industries; however, phase-1 remedies do lead to fewer notifications of potentially 
anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries. These results are, in our view, 
encouraging for two reasons. First, it indicates that EC merger-policy actions involve greater 
deterrence in high-concentration industries—industries where it would be quite beneficial to 
discourage further merger activity. Second, these results are also consistent with phase-1 
remedies principally deterring anti-competitive as opposed to pro-competitive merger 
notifications. Taken together, we can tentatively conclude that deterrence takes place mainly in 
those industries where it matters most, and that this deterrence is desirable in terms of which 
type of mergers are deterred. 
In sum, we find phase-1 remedies to be effective – and phase-2 remedies and phase-2 
preventions to be ineffective – in the deterrence of future merger activity. The weak deterrence 
implications of secondary-phase remedies and preventions may represent a concern for EC 
antitrust policy, as this suggests that the EC does not generate robust deterrence from any of its 
enforcement efforts taking place in the later stages of the merger review process. To the degree 
that EC antitrust authorities are concerned about merger-policy deterrence, our results suggest 
that they should move more enforcement actions to the initial stages, or employ more 
preventions in order to create more bargaining power in the secondary stage. 
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